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Abstract 
This paper evaluates current US policies towards political reconstruction in 
Iraq using a gendered lens in order to identify the impact upon women and 
gender relations. I will argue that, despite an apparent high-level political 
commitment to Iraqi women within the US administration, current policies 
towards Iraq are not helping to reduce gender inequalities. This is because 
US measures that are targeted at women alone do not consider women’s 
position within gender relations and, therefore, do little to address the question 
of gender relations. Certain US policies, such as de-Baathification and the 
establishment of governance mechanisms along sectarian/communal lines, 
have exacerbated trends that contribute to increasing gender inequalities, as 
well as helping to fuel the current violence. These trends bring into question 
Iraqi women’s ability to fully participate in the public sphere, despite many 
efforts by Iraqi women’s groups to protect and promote women’s rights in 
post-Ba‘th Iraq. 
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Arab world. 
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Introduction1 
Part of the rhetoric of both George Bush and Tony Blair justifying the invasion 
of Iraq in March 2003 was to liberate the Iraqi people, including Iraqi women, 
from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.2 Both the US and UK authorities 
have stated that they are committed to ensuring that Iraqi women play an 
integral role in the reconstruction of Iraq.3 The ouster of the Ba‘thist regime 
has opened up new possibilities for Iraqi women and men and there is little 
doubt that liberalisation of the political sphere is very much welcomed. Yet, 
two years after the fall of the Ba‘thist regime, there are many questions 
surrounding the future ability of Iraqi women to participate fully in public life. 
Women suffer disproportionately from the prevailing environment of insecurity, 
unable to go out to work, attend school/university, seek medical care or fully 
participate in civil and political activities; violent political groups target women 
who are active in public affairs, whilst ordinary women are harassed on the 
streets for not wearing the veil; and women’s rights are threatened by the 
compromises of leaders negotiating political arrangements for a future Iraq.  
 
This paper evaluates current US policies towards political reconstruction in 
Iraq using a gendered lens in order to identify the impact upon women and 
gender relations. I will argue that, despite an apparent high-level political 
commitment to Iraqi women within the US administration, current policies 
towards Iraq are not helping to improve gender inequalities and, 
consequently, are contributing to increasing the current violence and 
impacting negatively on women’s ability to fully participate in the public 
sphere. This is because US measures that are targeted at women alone do 
                                                
1
 This paper is part of a joint project with Dr Nadje al-Ali, University of Exeter, entitled, ‘The 
Role of Women and Gender in Political Transition in Iraq’ and is part-funded by the British 
Academy. 
2
 It is significant that none of the US declarations about Iraqi women talk about ‘women’s 
rights’ per se. Rather, they talk about freedom and equality for all Iraqis.  
3
 In a message to participants in the Voice of Women in Iraq Conference, 9 July 2003, George 
Bush said, “The women of Iraq’s courage and resolve are hopeful examples to all who seek to 
restore Iraq’s place among the world’s greatest civilizations. Their efforts also inspire 
individuals throughout the Middle East who seek a future based on equality, respect, and rule 
of law”.  
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4 
not consider women’s position within gender relations and, therefore, do little 
to address the question of gender relations. 
 
Towards this end, I begin by outlining the relationship between women, 
gender and peace-building. Then, I examine the relationship between 
measures directly targeted at increasing women’s political participation, the 
socio-economic situation and the rise in communal-based politics. It is only by 
examining the wider political, social and economic context through a gendered 
lens that it is possible to identify trends in gender relations, identities and roles 
that impact upon women’s ability to participate. 
 
Women, Gender and Peace-building 
Successful reconstruction of war-torn countries must lead to sustainable 
peace. For sustainable peace to occur, there must be not merely a cessation 
of conflict but also an absence of those factors that lead to conflict. Johan 
Galtung argues that conflict is much more than direct violence. “There is also 
the violence frozen into structures, and the culture that legitimizes violence” 
(Galtung, 1996: viii). In other words, structural inequalities may generate 
violence. Consequently, post-conflict reconstruction should aim to construct a 
more equitable society in order to avoid the reoccurrence of violence in the 
future, rather than to re-construct what existed prior to conflict breaking out. 
Obviously, the encouragement of more equitable gender relations is an 
essential part of this process. 
 
As Cynthia Cockburn argues, Galtung’s concept of ‘structural violence’ has 
gendered dimensions and implications (Cockburn, 2004: 30). Structural 
inequalities are (re)produced through gender relations, roles and identities. 
For example, deteriorating economic conditions may lead to both male and 
female unemployment amongst certain sections of the population. However, 
men may experience unemployment as not only the loss of income but also 
as a failure to fulfil their social role as the family breadwinner and, ultimately, 
as a threat to their masculinity. On the other hand, a reduction in the level of 
state welfare provision is usually disproportionately felt by women, whose 
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5 
socially sanctioned roles often make them the primary care-givers and, 
consequently, dependent on state welfare services more than men. 
 
The gendered reproduction of structural inequalities alerts us to the 
significance of considering the impact of reconstruction policies on gender 
relations, roles and identities. A gendered approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction is not merely a question of making policies that are targeted at 
women’s roles or acknowledging women’s right to participate in the 
reconstruction process. It is also a question of recognising that policies that 
are aimed at men and women will affect men differently from women with 
various implications for the nature of gender relations, roles and identities and, 
thus, for the nature of social inequalities. In order to avoid the (re)construction 
of sources of structural violence, it is essential that we examine the links 
between reconstruction policies, gender and social relations. 
 
A part of the process of understanding the links between reconstruction 
policies, gender and social relations, is to identify the nature of gender and 
social relations prior to conflict. Saddam Hussein’s regime was rooted within 
social networks of patronage, governed by tribal, clan and religious identities 
and rooted in a political culture of patrimonialism and patriarchy (Faleh, 2003). 
These networks made up a ‘shadow state’ that helped to institutionalise 
inequalities between different groups based on ethnic, religious and class 
differences. Simultaneously, the institutionalisation of these inequalities acted 
to construct social identities based on difference. As in the construction of all 
social identities, gender played a significant role in contributing to establishing 
identity differences between different social groups. The removal of Saddam 
Hussein and the de-Baathification of Iraqi institutions have not led to the 
dismantling of these networks nor the social relations and identities that 
underpin them. Indeed, the end of Ba‘thist rule and the resulting political and 
security vacuums has created an environment in which these social networks 
and their accompanying identities have taken on a new significance. The 
readjustment of these social networks has created the structural inequalities 
that are fuelling violence across Iraq—not only the violence of the insurgents 
against the coalition forces or the terror attacks against civilians, but also 
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everyday criminality and, in particular, the rising levels of violence against 
women.  
 
Addressing existing structural inequalities, rooted in unequal social relations, 
is a condition for the cessation of the current, widespread violence as well as 
the promotion of more egalitarian gender relations. I argue that it is necessary 
to examine the gendered impact of current policies towards Iraq in terms of 
their influence on social relations and, in particular, their impact upon either 
mitigating or exacerbating structural violence. The reduction in structural 
inequalities is linked to an improvement in gender relations and also to the 
building of peace and democracy for all Iraqis, regardless of sex, religion or 
ethnicity.  
 ‘Saving Iraqi women’: measures aimed at increasing Iraqi women’s 
participation 
On the face of it, it would appear that the US and its allies are concerned with 
gender—or at least with women in Iraq. The Bush administration has allocated 
not inconsiderable sums of money to projects aimed at improving women’s 
participation in political, civil and economic life. The issue of Iraqi women’s 
situation is the subject of a number of official speeches and statements about 
the reconstruction of Iraq. However, there is evidence to suggest that the US 
administration views the empowerment of Iraqi women as secondary to more 
‘strategic’ issues, such as the creation of political institutions and the 
establishment of security.  
 
It is difficult to find exact figures that would identify the amount of money 
allocated to projects aimed at supporting Iraqi women. Much has been made 
by the US government of the establishment of a $10 million Iraqi Women’s 
Democracy Initiative, which provides grants to NGOs to carry out democracy 
education, leadership training, political training, NGO coalition-building, 
organizational management, media training and, that all-important pillar of 
democracy, ‘teaching entrepreneurship’.4 According to Under Secretary of 
                                                
4
 Office of the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues, “US Commitment to 
Women in Iraq”, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2004 
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State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, the initiative is aimed “to help 
women become full and vibrant partners in Iraq’s developing democracy”.5  
 
The approach of the democracy initiative projects is very much in line with 
liberal assumptions about women’s position in society. The focus is on getting 
women into the public sphere, through the provision of skills and material 
resources. For example, one of the grant recipients, the Johns Hopkins 
School of Strategic and International Studies, is working with Iraqi NGOs to 
collect and translate national constitutions, international covenants and other 
conventions on women’s rights into Arabic to serve as a resource for an Iraqi 
women’s rights centre they will build. Another grant recipient, the Kurdish 
Human Rights Watch, will work with Iraqi women and other groups to mobilize 
households to vote. The Independent Women’s Forum (IWF) is using their 
grant to train women to participate in a ‘Women Leaders Program’ and 
‘Democracy Information Centre’. The training includes topics on intra- and 
inter-governmental affairs, democracy building, campaigning and the role of 
the media6—but, significantly, not the role of women and gender in politics. 
That is perhaps unsurprising in light of the fact that the IWF was established 
to combat ‘radical’ feminism and is allied with conservative trends within US 
politics.7 
 
In addition to the Democracy Initiative, the US has also allocated money for 
other projects targeted at women or which include women as beneficiaries. 
These include organizing and supporting meetings/conferences that discuss 
women’s participation in politics and/or enhancing women’s role in Iraq; 
supporting the establishment of women’s centres around the country that 
provide vocational/business training, micro-credit and information on legal 
                                                
5
 USINFO, “Iraqi Women Receiving Democracy Training Ahead of Elections”, 27 September 
2004 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 IWF objectives include: “To counter the dangerous influence of radical feminism in the 
courts … Educate women on the benefits of the free market and the danger of big 
government …” 
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services, amongst other things; support for women’s organizations and other 
groups working on women’s issues (grants worth up to $6.5 million).8  
 
The US administration is also keen to point out, via the State Department 
website, that Iraqi women occupy official political positions. The Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL), signed in March 2004, stated a 25 per cent goal of 
female participation in the interim assembly (the Transitional National 
Assembly)—and indeed women ended up representing more than 30 per cent 
of the assembly following the January 2005 elections. In addition, the TAL 
assures equality for all regardless of gender, religion, sect, belief, nationality 
or origin. The Iraqi cabinet, announced in May 2004, contained six women 
ministers out of a total of 33.9 Women are also represented on the Baghdad 
City Council and neighbourhood and district councils around the capital. 10 
However, fewer women serve in the 18 Iraqi provinces and none have been 
appointed as provincial governor (Hunt and Posa, 2004: 43). 
 
Yet, there are inconsistencies between the US administration’s rhetoric on 
women’s empowerment and its actual efforts in the immediate post-invasion 
period. For example, the urgency of the situation in Iraq led to USAID 
obtaining a waiver for a gender assessment (USAID rules make a gender 
assessment mandatory before working in a country). A USAID gender advisor 
for Iraq was not appointed until August 2004 and, as a result, in the immediate 
post-invasion period there was no attention paid to making policies gender-
sensitive.11 The gender advisor has been posted to Washington DC and has 
no counterpart in Baghdad, hindering her work. For those working on the 
ground, ‘gender’ has been conceptualised as ‘women’, and CPA measures 
targeted at women consisted of channelling money from international donors 
to women’s groups or civil society groups providing services for women 
through the Office of Women’s Affairs in the CPA. The CPA had no gender 
                                                
8
 Office of the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues, “US Commitment to 
Women in Iraq”, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2004 
9
 At the time of writing, a new government was being formed and a new cabinet had not yet 
been announced. 
10
 Office of the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues, “US Commitment to 
Women in Iraq”, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2004 
11
 UNIFEM, “Gender Profile of the Conflict in Iraq.  
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strategy (only a stated political commitment to supporting Iraqi women) and no 
policy for mainstreaming gender.  
 
The issue of increasing women’s representation within governance structures 
was raised and promoted by Iraqi women’s groups and diplomatic 
interventions by the UK’s special representative to Iraq and the UK-funded 
gender advisor in Baghdad. In the beginning, The CPA appointed only three 
women to the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (and there are accusations 
of tokenism in at least one of the appointments). At local levels around the 
country, the selection of members for municipal and provincial councils was 
organized by military personnel charged with ‘post-conflict’ operations. In 
many cases, they prioritized security over empowering women and “did not 
want to anger local men” by pushing for women’s participation.12 No women 
were appointed to the 24-member constitutional drafting committee for the 
Transitional Administrative Law. Only three women were appointed to the 
nine-member Independent Electoral Commission—the body responsible for 
preparing Iraq for elections in January 2005.13 The CPA declined to support 
allocation of seats for women in the National Assembly, despite consistent 
demands by Iraqi women’s groups for a 40% quota for women’s 
representation and UK government proposals for a 25% quota, because the 
US administration did not want to contradict its anti-affirmative action policy. In 
the end, a ‘target’ of 25% was included in the interim constitution.14 
 
Women have managed to win more than 30% of the seats in the Transitional 
National Assembly. Nevertheless, this alone will not guarantee women’s 
rights. Women’s rights are endangered by the prospects of introducing 
religious-based family laws. Currently, family law in Iraq is governed by the 
civil courts and this is perceived as providing women with a relative degree of 
protection in family matters (compared to many other countries in the Middle 
East region). Special provisions must be made in the future constitution in 
order to protect and build on these gains. Yet, the (current) transitional 
                                                
12
 Ibid, p. 43; interviews with members of the RTI Local Government and Democratisation 
Project, Kuwait, May 2004. 
13
 UNIFEM, “Gender Profile of the Conflict in Iraq.  
14
 Ibid, pp. 43–44; UNIFEM, “Gender Profile of the Conflict in Iraq.  
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constitution, despite (or because of!) its very liberal nature, does not provide 
these protections. Whilst guaranteeing equality between men and women, it 
also states that no law may contravene Islam (Cole and Cole, 2004). 
Experience in countries such as Egypt demonstrates that such articles may be 
used to attack women’s rights, particularly in those matters pertaining to 
marriage and divorce, on the grounds of observing religion. Indeed, women’s 
rights have already been threatened by the passing of Resolution 137 at the 
end of December 2003, which aimed at subjecting personal status matters to 
religious jurisdiction.15 The resolution was not signed by Paul Bremer 
following protests by Iraqi women, and, therefore, did not enter into force. 
However, the attempt by some Iraqi politicians to make religion more central 
to Iraqi legislation threatens the rights of women particularly in areas of 
marriage, divorce and child custody.16 
 
The above US policies towards Iraqi women’s participation may be criticised 
for a number of reasons. An approach to improving women’s position through 
promoting their participation in the public sphere may be considered limited in 
scope in light of feminist critiques of the liberal assumptions about the 
public/private divide. Women’s public participation is not dependent upon 
acquiring the appropriate skills or upon the existence of legal frameworks 
guaranteeing formal equality. Public participation is dependent upon women’s 
social position, which, in turn, is shaped by gender relations within the so-
called private sphere. This demonstrates the need to pursue policies that 
target gender (which is a relational concept) rather than targeting merely 
women. 
 
However, the inconsistency of US policies in terms of promoting women’s 
position and numbers within public affairs, points not only to the US 
administration’s conservatism in this regard but also to assumptions about the 
role of the US in ‘saving Iraqi women’—not from the ‘oppression’ of Islam, as 
former colonizing powers once aimed to achieve—but from the barbarities of 
                                                
15
 For further details, see, for example, “Press Release: Iraqi women reject decision no. 137 
passed by the Iraqi Governing Council on 29/12/2003”, 20 January 2004, 
http://www.occupationwatch.org.  
16
 Human Rights Watch, “Interim Constitution Shortchanges Women”, 5 March 2004. 
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Saddam Hussein. The State Department’s website includes a good number of 
statements by various high-ranking government officials (President Bush, 
former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul 
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of State for Global Affair Paul Dobriansky) that 
consistently link US commitment to promoting the position of Iraqi women with 
the liberation of Iraq from the terrifying tyranny of Saddam Hussein— where 
women were subject to torture in rape chambers and suffered the 
assassination/disappearance of male relatives. 
 
The gendered discourse that represents women as symbols of a new post-
Saddam order and, thereby, justifies US military intervention in Iraq is no more 
apparent than in an op-ed piece by Paul Wolfowitz (a central figure in US 
foreign policy making), written following his second visit to post-Saddam Iraq: 
[… ] Rajaa Khuzai, a 57-year old mother of seven and one 
of three women on the Iraq Governing Council. In 1991, 
when Saddam Hussein sent Republican Guards to put 
down a rebellion in her town of Diwaniya, Khuzai was the 
only doctor left functioning in her hospital. An obstetrician, 
she remembers performing more than 20 Caesareans 
working alone by candlelight. Today Khuzai remains 
undaunted by the challenges of helping to give birth to 
freedom in a country that was abused for more than three 
decades by a regime of murderers and torturers…” 
(Wolfowitz, 2004). 
 
Policies targeted at Iraqi women constitute an element of a discourse that 
constructs Iraqi women as symbols of US efforts to create a post-Saddam 
order. In this way, women’s participation is not an end in itself but rather a 
means to a (US-defined) end. Conversely, US policies and statements 
concerning Iraqi women have contributed towards making Iraqi women a 
symbol of the definition of the post-Saddam political order for all political 
forces within Iraq. This representation, and its implications for gender relations 
and identities, is examined again later. 
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The impact of socio-economic conditions on gender relations 
Approaches to reconstruction that focus on women’s role in the public sphere 
assume that the only barrier to women’s participation is the availability of 
opportunities and an adequate framework of legal rights. In any society, 
women’s ability to participate outside the home is constrained by what is 
happening within the home—  degree of care-giving responsibilities, of work 
involved in performing household chores and of support from relatives 
(particularly, male relatives) for the idea of women participating in the public 
sphere. The nature of gender relations, roles and identities shapes the nature 
of women’s participation in the public sphere. In the context of Iraq, women 
are further limited from leaving the home because they feel vulnerable to 
attack.  
 
Gender relations in Iraq have changed over the years in relation to Iraq’s 
changing political and socio-economic circumstances— themselves a result of 
national and international factors. The Iraqi women’s movement dates back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century and was active in the struggle against 
British colonialism. In the post-independence period, the Iraqi women’s 
movement was successful in lobbying to achieve a relatively progressive 
personal status law compared to other Muslim countries.  
 
Iraqi women’s mass participation in the public sphere is associated with the oil 
boom of the 1970s (after Saddam Hussein came to power). State policies 
were designed to encourage women’s participation in the labour force and to 
eradicate female illiteracy in order to contribute to state development. 
University graduates, both men and women, were guaranteed state 
employment and a large number of women entered professions such as 
medicine and education. Women’s employment was supported by paid 
maternity leave of up to one year and free crèche facilities. During the war 
with Iran in the 1980s, women entered the labour force in even greater 
numbers to take the place of men who were sent to fight or were killed. 
However, simultaneously, a pro-natalist discourse also encouraged women to 
give birth to more children to replace the large numbers of soldiers killed.  
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Since 1991, with the imposition of sanctions, Iraqis in general and the middle 
classes in particular have experienced a profound deterioration in their living 
standards and access to employment and education. This has impacted upon 
women differentially from men. Under sanctions, overall economic conditions 
declined and infrastructure was not maintained leading to a decline in basic 
services. Women have borne the brunt of the worsening socio-economic 
situation as those traditionally responsible for household management and 
care-giving (Al-Ali, 2003). Moreover, as a result of war, political persecution 
and male out-migration, many women have found themselves the heads of 
households. Women have also suffered from the collapse of the welfare state, 
which guaranteed employment and other benefits (ibid). The number of 
women turning to prostitution to make a living increased. Meanwhile, women’s 
illiteracy rates climbed as families chose not to send girls to school for 
economic reasons. 
 
Since the fall of the Ba‘th regime, women’s socio-economic situation has 
improved in some respects but not others. On the one hand, incomes in some 
sectors of the economy, particularly state employment where women are well-
represented, have risen and more goods are available and affordable (CSIS, 
2004: 45)17. CPA economic policies have failed to address the question of 
structural inequalities within Iraq and, in some cases, have actually 
exacerbated some inequalities. First of all, employment creation was not a 
priority of the CPA and unemployment in the post-invasion period has 
remained high (between 25 and 60%) (CSIS, 2004: 46, 49). Women, elderly 
people and people with disabilities make up a large portion of the 
unemployed. Plans to privatize Iraqi public enterprises also threaten to 
exacerbate unemployment as the public sector workforce is down-sized to 
make companies more attractive to private buyers. Women, in particular, are 
disadvantaged by a reduction in public sector employment, since this also 
entails them losing access to benefits such as workplace crèches.18 
                                                
17
 It should be noted that this study does not provide disaggregated data based on gender. 
18
 Data from Egypt suggests that women state employees are adversely affected by 
privatisation. See Pratt, September 1997. 
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Simultaneously, men, and in particular young men whose education suffered 
under sanctions, are unable to find work and, as a result, become key 
constituencies for different radical groups, many of whom are violent. For 
example, Muqtada al-Sadr has managed to mobilise a large number of young 
men from one of Baghdad’s poorest areas— Sadr City. 
 
Women, as those who usually hold primary responsibilities for household 
management, are also particularly disadvantaged by the slow pace in the 
rehabilitation of basic services. For example, electricity supply, although up 
from pre-war levels, is still not meeting demand. One Iraqi woman recounts 
how sporadic energy supplies impacts upon her daily life: 
On Friday, a day of rest, I get busy as soon as the 
[electric] current comes on, and sometimes, I even get up 
at six in the morning to do the wash and vacuum. 
Sometimes, I’ve only accomplished half the cleaning 
when the current is interrupted. If I have the strength, I 
continue the wash by hand … All that leaves little room 
for intellectual activities. Reading has become an out-of-
place luxury! (Ahmed, 2005) 
 
Women’s caring responsibilities are also increased in light of the poor 
sanitation situation and difficulty of access to healthcare. There has been an 
increase in water-borne diseases since the fall of Saddam. In certain parts of 
the country, people are dependent upon polluted water sources (CSIS, 2004: 
59–61). Meanwhile, there are criticisms that the US failed to allocate the 
necessary sums for the rehabilitation of the education and healthcare systems 
sufficiently early (CSIS, 2004: 77–78). In addition, the actions of both US 
soldiers and the insurgents has increased the numbers of dead and wounded, 
thereby increasing demand on the healthcare system. 
 
The lack of security compounds women’s burdens. Women find it dangerous 
to travel to healthcare facilities, to work or even to leave the house to do 
shopping (CSIS, 2004: 69–75). Violence against women has increased since 
the immediate post-invasion chaos, when an alarming number of cases of 
sexual violence and abductions of women and girls were identified in Baghdad 
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alone.19 Women are abducted by gangs, raped, beaten and their bodies 
dumped or they are sold into prostitution. If they manage to survive the ordeal, 
the stigma attached to rape deters women from coming forward to report 
cases of sexual violence. They could be killed by their families as a result of 
the shame they have brought. Moreover, it acts to prevent women from 
leaving the house alone in fear that they could be accused of bringing this 
shame on their own families (Elich, 2004). In addition, women in public life 
have been threatened or killed. For example, Governing Council member 
‘Aquila al-Hashimi was killed in September 2003 and many women’s rights 
organizations have received death threats.20  
 
The poor security situation is the responsibility of the US as an occupying 
power according to the Geneva Conventions. In the immediate invasion 
period, a security vacuum opened up because of the de-Baathification policies 
of the CPA. The existing police force became ineffectual since many senior 
police officers were removed from their posts and the Iraqi army was 
completely dissolved. It is argued that the US did not make sufficient plans for 
establishing a transitional security force to take over in the aftermath of the 
invasion (Traub, 2004: 32). Recruitment and training for a new police force 
has been slow and police officers are under-resourced and unable to make an 
impact on improving general security for ordinary Iraqis (Cordesman, 2004). 
Meanwhile, those Iraqi soldiers and police who have found themselves 
without a job due to the de-Baathification policies became potential 
candidates for recruitment by the insurgents (Diamond, 2004: 11). 
 
Those women who do venture out find themselves under increasing pressure 
to wear the veil, both to avoid ‘inviting rapists’ and also to avoid harassment 
by religious groups. At many universities around the country religious groups 
monitor girls’ clothing to ensure that it is suitably modest (Elich, 2004). The 
pressures felt by women to behave and dress more modestly are a reflection 
of an upsurge in religiosity that goes back to the days of Saddam’s rule. 
However, the growth in power of religious groups is very much a product of 
                                                
19
 Human Rights Watch, July 2003; Amnesty International, 31 March 2004.  
20
 Feminist Daily News Wire, 26 March 2004.  
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the political and social climate of post-Saddam Iraq. US policies have 
contributed to a climate of social conservatism and an upsurge in the power of 
religious groups in several ways with disastrous results for gender relations 
and gender identities in Iraq. The next section will examine these factors. 
 
Women Losing Ground 
The most serious long-term impact for women’s position within post-Saddam 
Iraqi society comes as a result of growing social conservatism and increasing 
communalism. Both these trends are influenced by US reconstruction policies 
and the response to continuing US occupation. As a result of these trends, 
gender relations and gender identities are being reshaped in ways that restrict 
women’s freedoms and threaten women’s rights. 
 
The rise in social conservatism may be traced back to the 1990s when Iraq 
was under sanctions. Economic hardship fuelled growing religiosity and social 
conservatism amongst ordinary Iraqis (Al-Ali, 2003). The growing inability of 
men to fulfil their traditional roles of providing for their families, coupled with 
the humiliations of defeat in war and the imposition of sanctions, no doubt 
impacted upon men’s own sense of their masculinity (Belhachmi, 2004: 13) – 
as, no doubt, did the use of sexual abuse and torture on male political activists 
and their female relatives. In such situations, men attempt to reassert their 
masculinity and control over their environment through control of female 
relatives and even through violence towards them (Belhachmi, 2004: 13). 
 
In addition, Saddam Hussein began to use religious symbols as a means to 
legitimize his rule. He introduced new laws that supposedly boosted the 
regime’s Islamic credentials, such as the imposition of the death penalty for 
prostitutes and preventing women from travelling abroad without a male 
relative. Simultaneously, he promoted and manipulated tribalism as a way of 
creating a support base for the regime. Tribal leaders began to wield 
increasing power through the use of customary courts, which provided no 
protection for women’s rights (Tripp, 2000). 
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To a large extent, these trends have been consolidated by post-invasion 
measures. It is clear that the US administration perceives Iraqi society in 
terms of a collection of distinct communities: Sunni, Shi‘a, Kurd, Christian, 
Turkmen, etc. This is reflected in the way that the CPA selected members of 
the interim Governing Council. Seats were apportioned according to 
religious/ethnic sect (Alkadiri & Toensing, 2003).  Subsequently, sectarianism 
has largely determined political behaviour in Iraq. Political parties formed in 
preparation for the January 2005 elections vied for power not on the basis of 
ideological distinctions but on the basis of sectarian affiliations. Indeed, those 
groups that failed to get any or almost no seats were those who shunned 
sectarian politics. Consequently, rules for allocating seats in the National 
Assembly along proportional lines have created a de facto confessional 
system. 
 
The communal nature of politics is reflected and perhaps amplified at the local 
level, where political action is perceived as being more effective (Rangwala, 
2005: 172). Actions of coalition forces in the immediate post-invasion period 
helped to develop this trend. They depended upon ‘local leaders’ to fill the 
political vacuum left by the fall of the Ba‘th regime and to contribute to the 
provision of basic services and security. This enabled religious groups and 
tribal leaders to come to the fore, thereby consolidating their power locally.21 
For example, the US military was forced to rely on the cooperation of the 
militias of the SCIRI and Dawa (two religious Shi‘ite parties, with close links to 
Iran) in order to defeat the Mahdi army of Muqtada al-Sadr in April 2004 
(Diamond, 2004). The growing power of religious groups in Shiite areas has 
enabled them to ban alcohol sellers, harass women for not covering up and 
even to introduce the shari‘a in some courts (Wong, 2005). 
 
Moreover, political parties root their support in networks of clientalism— in their 
ability to provide goods and services that are unavailable through other 
channels to their local support base.  Given the high level of unemployment, 
one important mechanism of patron–client relations has been access to jobs 
                                                
21
 Interviews with RTI personnel, Kuwait, May 2004. 
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via recommendation letters from parties represented on the national level and 
close to the CPA (Rangwala, 2005: 174-5). In addition, those parties with their 
own militias (the SCIRI, the Kurdish parties) have been able to provide 
security in communities where they are based, as well as potential 
employment for young men. Through the provision of basic goods and 
services, communally-organised parties have mobilised support not only 
amongst young, unemployed youth but also amongst women, who see the 
benefits of the provision of social services and security in their communities.22  
 
In other words, the clientalistic networks that existed under Saddam have 
adapted and have been reproduced in the post-Saddam period, thereby 
helping to consolidate the power of local tribal, ethnic and religious leaders, to 
the detriment of gender equality and transparency of political institutions. In 
situations where communal identities come to the fore, encouraged by the 
political economy, women and democracy are the losers. Community leaders 
(whether religious, ethnic or tribal) aim to consolidate political power by 
promoting a homogenous, community identity that does not allow for or even 
tolerate internal differences or dissent. This creates pressures to conform, not 
only making political dissent difficult within the community, but also dissent 
from socially constructed norms about gender roles and relations.  
 
The power that leaders assert over their communities (however these are 
constructed) is rooted in their control of ‘their’ women. Women feel pressures 
to bear ‘the burden of representation’ of their communities (Mercer, 1990). 
This often leads to social restrictions on women’s sexuality and their public 
roles/behaviour. As male sectarian leaders battle it out in the coming months 
to draw up the Iraqi constitution, it is very likely that women’s rights will be 
sacrificed in the name of political compromise between those who seek a 
more Islamic state and those who envisage a more secular state.  
 
Simultaneously, the on-going US occupation of Iraq, military attacks against 
armed militants resisting occupation and the publicizing of abuse in the Abu 
                                                
22
 Women for Women International, January 2005. 
UEA Papers in European and International Studies 
 
WP 3/2005 
 
 
19 
Ghrayb prison at the hands of US personnel have led to a heightening in anti-
US feeling amongst many Iraqis and/or fear to be seen to be cooperating with 
them. In this context, women’s rights become sacrificed in the name of 
reaffirming national sovereignty against the foreign invader. Women’s rights 
are targeted because they are seen as ‘Western’ imports— championed by 
‘Western’ politicians (as argued in section 1). It is, therefore, no surprise that 
women in public life and women’s rights organizations have been harassed 
and threatened by Iraqi political groups and that Iraqi women in general feel 
pressures to act modestly and dress modestly. In the current climate, women 
are caught between a rock and a hard place. They bear the burden of 
symbolising a post-Saddam order— whether that is the order envisaged by the 
US, by secular male leaders or by religious conservatives. In all cases, the 
granting of women’s rights and the definition of women’s roles becomes the 
object of political struggle, with dire consequences for women themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
Rather than contributing to creating a sustainable peace and a process of 
democratisation, current policies towards Iraq are contributing to creating 
sources of structural violence and exacerbating conservative politics with 
negative effects on the nature of gender relations, identities and roles. First of 
all, allocating money to women’s training and conferences to discuss women’s 
rights is insufficient in improving the situation of women in Iraq. Rather, these 
measures operate to make women symbols of a post-Saddam Iraq and to 
help justify US intervention there. As a result, women become essentialised 
as instruments in the construction of a post-Saddam order, with the result that 
women’s bodies become the terrain of struggle between different political 
forces within post-Saddam Iraq. 
Moreover, US reconstruction policies have acted to undermine women’s 
ability to participate in public affairs. The US has been slow to rehabilitate 
basic services, has not sufficiently invested in education and health, and has 
not prioritized employment creation. These are all areas that would make a 
significant impact on the quality of life of all Iraqis and, in particular, of Iraqi 
women who continue to bear the major burden for the maintenance of the 
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social well-being of their families. By freeing Iraqi women from some of these 
burdens through adequate provision of basic services and welfare, this would 
reduce some of the constraints on Iraqi women’s participation in public life. 
Moreover, the dedication of more resources to employment creation would 
help to reduce the potential pool of young men without economic opportunities 
that are being drawn into violent groups (whether those of the insurgency or 
radical groups such as Muqtada Sadr’s Mahdi Army).  
 
The state of lawlessness, coupled with military operations, impacts 
enormously on women’s ability to leave their homes— whether to work, to 
shop or to seek medical care. Women fear abduction and rape and all the 
consequences that this would bring in terms of how their families and society 
would treat them. It is incumbent upon the occupying powers to take 
responsibility for the security of ordinary Iraqis and to recognise that women 
are particularly vulnerable to the current ‘climate of fear’ generated by 
widespread violence. This ‘climate of fear’ acts to push women out of the 
public sphere. 
 
The most alarming trend that we see in Iraq is that of growing social 
conservatism and the power of communal politics, which has been 
exacerbated by the policies of the coalition forces. This is clearly an area 
where gender-blind policies have a detrimental effect on women’s lives. The 
failure of decision-makers to examine the gendered implications of their 
measures towards various Iraqi political groups leads to a situation in which 
women’s rights and freedoms are being sacrificed for the sake of political and 
strategic interests. In addition, hostility towards the US occupation and the 
association of women’s rights with Western intervention consolidates the 
threat against more egalitarian gender relations. Measures to promote 
women’s rights are resisted by some political actors as a means of 
demonstrating resistance to US political influence. 
 
Despite the bleak picture painted here regarding the potential for women to 
participate in reconstruction, there are many examples of women organising 
to improve their position within society. This paper does not seek to deny the 
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importance and impact of their efforts. Moreover, I do not want to invalidate 
the opportunities and democratic spaces that have opened up (for women and 
for men) as a result of the end of the repressive rule of the Ba‘athist regime. 
Yet it does attempt to identify the dangers that are posed to women being able 
to consolidate these efforts and make gains. Unfortunately, there are many 
examples from around the world in which women have lost ground in post-
conflict situations and political transitions due to the failure of key decision-
makers to incorporate a gendered lens into their approaches to 
reconstruction. The current situation in Iraq signifies that the lessons learned 
from other post-conflict situations have not been taken on board. 
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